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In April 2014, the population of Tunisia stood at 10,982,754, only 
0.5 percent of whom were foreign immigrants according to the 
country’s sixth census. First-generation, Tunisia-born migrants 
residing abroad stood at around 543,000, of whom 81 percent were 
to be found in Europe that year. As for “Tunisians Residing Abroad” 
(Tunisiens Résidant à l’Etranger”), first-generation migrants and 
born-abroad second and third generation Tunisians, they numbered 
about 1.2 million according to the records of the Office for Tunisians 
Abroad (OTE).1 Tunisia is, therefore, primarily an emigration 
country. 
Starting after the end of the French Protectorate in 1956, Tunisian 
emigration responded to labour needs in Western Europe, and 
especially in France. Bilateral labour agreements were signed in 
1963 between Tunisia and France, with Germany in 1965, as well as, 
latterly, with the Netherlands and other European states. After 1973-
74, as limitations were put on legal labour migration to the West, the 
main pathway to traditional European destinations became family 
reunion. Irregular immigration developed in parallel. This also 
relied on kinship ties and on social and community-based networks. 
Tunisian migrants in Europe, mostly originating from urban 
coastal regions, quickly inserted themselves within tertiary sector 
activities, especially local trade facilities in town centers, ethnic 
food business, communications and related services.2 Meanwhile, 
as oil exploitation was taking off in the late 1960s, Libya emerged 
as a major destination for Tunisian migrant workers. Legal, as well 
as irregular migration channels, sustained by cross-border tribal 
connections, brought increasing numbers of Tunisians to Libya (up 
to 85,000 in the mid-1980s), mostly from the border areas and from 
the poor, steppe regions in west-central Tunisia (Gafsa, Sidi Bouzid, 
Kasserine, Kairouan). Tunisians in Libya were overwhelmingly 
employed in construction, infrastructure development and 
agriculture.3 Migration to Libya was, nevertheless, characterised by 
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a high turnover, due to unstable diplomatic relations 
between Libya and its neighbours: between 1969 and 
2012, migrants in the country went through eight 
expulsions of foreign nationals (including Tunisians) 
and three “open-door” policy phases. Informality 
thus became an increasingly predominant feature of 
the Tunisian migration to Libya.4
In the 1980s, as labour migration to France 
plummeted, Italy became a new outlet for Tunisian 
workers, due to its geographical proximity to 
Tunisia and to new opportunities in the country’s 
informal economy. After Europe restricted its visa 
regime and strengthened border controls in the 
early 1990s, permanent settlement, irregular entry, 
and overstaying became structural features of 
Tunisian emigration to Europe.5 Tunisian migration 
destinations further diversified towards the Gulf 
States, after bilateral agreements for technical 
cooperation were signed, between Tunisia and Saudi 
Arabia, and with Qatar and the UAE. Tunisians there 
are mostly skilled and highly-skilled, in secondment 
from Tunisia’s government sector: there are, for 
example, engineers and teachers.6 More recently, 
new flows of students and tertiary-educated, highly-
skilled young Tunisians found new outlets, in 
Germany and in North America.
Both under Habib Bourguiba and his successor Zine 
El Abidine Ben Ali, ousted in January 2011, Tunisia’s 
emigration policy had two principles: workers were 
encouraged to emigrate; and Tunisians living abroad 
were monitored. The Tunisian government indeed 
rapidly acknowledged the fact that the country’s 
economy was unable to absorb all the available 
labour force, and that remittances from abroad were 
an indispensable source of foreign currencies. As 
early as 1967, the Tunisian government set up the 
Office for Vocational Training and Employment 
(‘Office de la Formation Professionnelle et de 
l’Emploi’), with offices everywhere on Tunisian 
territory.7 Created in 1972, the Tunisian Agency 
for Technical Cooperation (ATCT) is one of the 
instruments for the implementation of the national 
policy of technical cooperation, mainly directed 
towards oil-producing countries, such as Libya 
and the Gulf States. It is currently placed under 
the supervision of the Ministry of Development 
Investment and International Cooperation.8 The 
Ministry of Vocational Training and Employment 
was created in 1990. Its mission (to date) is to 
promote the external employment of Tunisians. In 
this ministry, the National Agency for Employment 
and Independent Labour (ANETI) (previously 
OFPE) identifies labour migration opportunities for 
workers at all skill levels, and enters into agreements 
with Tunisia’s main migration partners.9
As regards migrant monitoring, a network of 
amicales (friendship societies) was set up in France 
and in other Western European countries from the 
1970s onwards, whose leaders were members of 
Tunisia’s ruling party.10 Political institutions were 
exclusively concerned with managing the economic, 
cultural and subsequently also political relations 
with the growing Tunisian diaspora. These include 
the Office for Tunisians abroad (‘Office des Tunisiens 
à l‘Étranger’, OTE), founded in 1988; and the Higher 
Council of Tunisians abroad (’Haut Conseil des 
Tunisiens à l‘Étranger’), founded in 1990.11
The 2000s was a period of socio-economic and 
political tensions. In Tunisia, as in the rest of the 
SEM region, younger Tunisians have benefitted 
from the generalization of higher education: in 
2009–2010, UNESCO data indicated that as many 
as 40 per cent of 18–23 year olds were enrolled in 
higher education in Tunisia. Yet, at the same time, 
structural adjustment policies and other socio-
economic reforms, underway in the country since 
the late 1980s,12 were taking effect. Employment 
venues had drastically decreased (especially in 
the government sector, a traditional employer 
of university graduates) and were becoming less 
attractive for educated youth due to wage stagnation 
and to the predominantly low skilled, low value-
added activities on offer. In Tunisia in 2010, 23 per 
cent of graduates were unemployed, as compared to 
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13 per cent for the whole population; as of 2012-2013, 
ILO estimated that around 32 percent of Tunisia’s 
youth aged 15-29 were “neither in employment nor 
in education or training” (NEET), double the EU-
28 average rate.13 Meanwhile, political reforms were 
stalling.14 Given this situation, access to a congested 
labour market becomes all the more difficult, 
so much so that personal connections or wasta 
(intermediation) are often needed to supplement 
qualifications and talent. Lastly, the 2008 financial 
crisis, which lowered incomes from tourism and 
subcontracting activities, further reduced both job 
prospects at home and legal migration opportunities 
for youth in Europe. Contraction of migration 
avenues, in a context of economic downturn and 
heightened political tensions, probably stands within 
the array of reasons explaining the outburst of the 
uprisings in Tunisia. 
The start of the Arab uprisings, in December 2010, 
spurred an immediate, yet comparatively moderate15 
surge in emigration from Tunisia through irregular 
channels, as police forces were disorganised and 
coastal controls proved inexistent. Between January 
and September 2011, 42,807 persons were recorded as 
entering Italy illegally by sea, compared with fewer than 
5,000 in 2010 and fewer than 10,000 in 2009. Of these, 
about 20,000 were Tunisians.16 Tunisian migrants 
who arrived in Italy between 1 January and 5 April 
2011 were granted temporary protection status as per 
article 20 of the country’s Consolidated Immigration 
Act providing for ‘Extraordinary reception measures 
for exceptional events’. Conversely, Tunisians arriving 
in Italy after 5 April 2011 were returned to Tunisia. 
Temporary protection permits were valid for six 
months (then renewed for other six months) and 
granted the holder the possibility of working and 
travelling in the Schengen area. Tunisian immigrants 
largely used these temporary visas to move on towards 
France.17 An accelerated repatriation agreement 
signed between Italy and Tunisia at the time curbed 
Tunisian emigration to the European Union (EU) by 
92 percent in 2012.18
Of the 42,807 persons recorded as entering Italy 
illegally by sea between January and September 
2011, 47 percent were non-Tunisians (18,451 
persons), including more than 17,000 Sub-Saharan 
Africans (17,342).19 Some were nationals from Sub-
Saharan African states, staying irregularly in Tunisia 
on their way to the EU: these are usually estimated at 
around 10,000.20  Others were part of the large wave 
of refugees induced by the beginning of the war in 
Libya, which primarily affected Tunisia. Tunisia is 
a signatory of the 1951 Refugee Convention and 
its 1967 Protocol. Yet, pressed by EU concerns for 
the externalisation of the protection of its borders, 
Tunisian policymakers had been addressing 
immigration from sub-Saharan Africa as a security 
issue, within the realm of the 2004 law largely 
criminalizing irregular migration,21 and failed to 
develop an asylum law. Therefore, in order to process 
refugees from Libya, and with migrants turned away 
from Europe back to Tunisia, UNHCR signed a 
cooperation agreement with Tunisian authorities 
in July 2011.22 UNHCR also carried out registration 
and refugee status determination including for 
people rescued at sea, with the help of some local 
partners. Refugees had access to basic services such 
as health and primary education in Tunisia, with 
UNHCR covering the cost for the most vulnerable.23 
Some refugee camps were also opened, among which 
the UNHCR-run Choucha camp on the border 
with Libya, closed mid-2013. Article 26 of the new 
constitution of 2014 formally acknowledges the right 
to political asylum and prohibits the extradition of 
political refugees, but UNHCR has been involved in 
the drafting of a national asylum law since 2011.24 In 
June 2016, the finalized draft law, developed with the 
Ministry of Justice, was being examined ahead of its 
discussion in Parliament.25
Before the 2011 revolts, migration had largely 
been absent from the media and public debates in 
Tunisia.26 Yet, migration now stands high in national 
priorities, under the pressure of civil society 
organisations which emerged in the aftermath of 
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the revolts.27An important legacy of the Tunisian 
uprising was the inclusion of representatives of 
migrants in the Constituent Assembly that also 
acted as Parliament, elected in October 2011. Article 
55 of the new Tunisian Constitution provides that 
the Election Law shall guarantee representation in 
the Chamber of the People’s Deputies for Tunisians 
living abroad.28 New institutions were created, among 
which the short-lived State Secretariat for Migration 
and Tunisians Abroad (SEMTE) within the Ministry 
of Social Affairs,29 and the National Observatory of 
Migration, established in March 2014. The Office 
of Tunisians Abroad (OTE) also underwent a 
drastic reform aimed at improving its efficiency.30 
Civil society generated new organisations too, for 
instance, the Higher Council for Tunisians Abroad, 
in order to sustain links with Tunisian expatriates 
and to ensure that the new government takes 
into consideration the demands and aspirations 
of its citizens abroad.31 Grassroots organisations, 
moreover, started advocating on new issues. Among 
these was the fate of refugees in Tunisia,32 as well as 
that of the young migrants lost at sea.33
Resuming legal emigration schemes was a burning 
need as unemployment rates soared in the 
aftermath of the revolts: they reached 19 percent in 
the total population and above 30 percent among 
graduates in 2011; 32.6 percent in 2013. During 
the first quarter of 2016, the total unemployment 
rate was 15.4 percent (12.5 percent for men and 
23 percent for females); it was still at 31.2 percent 
among university graduates (20.3 for men and 40 
percent for women).34 Attempts at formulating a 
comprehensive national migration strategy have 
been made since 2011: including the circulation of a 
draft National Migration Strategy, which was never 
formally adopted. Public institutions which deal 
with different aspects of migration management 
include: the Ministry of Social Affairs and its 
Office for Tunisians Abroad (OTE, with a network 
of 44 labour attachés); the Ministry of Vocational 
Training and Employment with its Bureau of Foreign 
Labour and its public employment service (ANETI, 
with more than 90 regional offices), including 
an International Employment Department; and 
the Tunisian Agency for Technical Cooperation 
(ACTC) under the Ministry of Development and 
International Cooperation. In addition, the country 
has a series of bilateral labour agreements signed 
with main destination countries (e.g. France, Italy 
and Switzerland), mainly with the aim of facilitating 
labour migration.35 The appointment of Tunisian 
labour attaches in Qatar and the United Arab 
Emirates through ATCT was also underway.36
Tunisia has been a priority for the EU, since the 
collapse of Ben Ali’s and Gadhafi’s regimes, both 
efficient allies of the EU in the defence of its external 
borders from irregular migrants; the need for a 
special relationship with Tunisia became particularly 
evident after the brief upsurge of migration from 
Tunisia to Europe in early 2011. To that effect, Tunisia 
concluded a number of readmission agreements 
with the main destination countries for irregular 
migrants, namely Italy, France and Switzerland. In 
addition to cooperation on border management, i.e. 
preventing unwanted migration to Europe, these 
agreements provided for the readmission to Tunisia 
of Tunisian migrants, as well as, in some cases, Third 
Country Nationals (TCNs). In November 2012, the 
European Union and Tunisia also signed an Action 
Plan for 2013-17 in the framework of the European 
Neighbourhood Policy. This Action Plan granted 
Tunisia ‘Privileged Partnership’ status and aimed 
at strengthening financial support, trade openings 
and improved mobility.37 As one of the forecast 
steps of this Partnership, the two parties were also 
prepared to start discussing the implementation 
of a Mobility Partnership for cooperation on 
the movement of people, the management of 
legal migration, migration and development, 
the protection of the rights of migrants, the fight 
against irregular migration and readmission.38 In 
this context, the country’s new regime tried to lay 
down priorities for negotiating these new patterns of 
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migration cooperation with the EU. These included 
labour migration, fundamental rights protection 
for migrants, visa facilitation and development.39 
This was, in sum, an attempt to break with the 
proactive securitization of migration performed 
under President Ben Ali. Yet, though it claimed to 
“take account of the interests and objectives of all 
parties concerned: the Union, its Member States, 
Tunisia and the migrants themselves”, the Mobility 
Partnership eventually signed between Tunisia and 
ten Member States40 on 3 March 201441 did not 
satisfy Tunisian civil society. According to a petition 
signed by a number of Tunisian and Human Rights 
organizations, “[…], the provisions included in 
this ‘Mobility Partnership’ do not provide Tunisian 
citizens with real opportunities to enter and live in 
the European Union. It limits itself to facilitating 
the issuance of visas to the most privileged and/or 
qualified persons, while the employment possibilities 
evoked are remote and are void of any concrete 
prospects. These commitments are insufficient when 
compared to the obligations imposed on Tunisia 
within the framework of the partnership, including 
tighter border controls, cooperation with Frontex, 
and the signature of a readmission agreement”.42 As 
a matter of fact, following the conditionality policy 
contained in all EU-supported agreements, the EU 
and Tunisia started negotiations on visa facilitation 
in October 2016; moreover, these negotiations on 
“an agreement to facilitate the process of issuing 
short-stay visas” were run in parallel with other 
negotiations on procedures for the readmission of 
irregular migrants to Tunisia.43
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OUTWARD MIGRATION
Stock
In 2014, an estimated 543,000 Tunisian migrants (i.e., 
first-generation, born in Tunisia) were residing abroad: 
4.7 percent of the total population of the country. The 
vast majority were in Europe (81 percent), with France 
alone hosting 48 percent and Italy 19 percent of these 
migrants.
As for the 1,223,213 holders of Tunisian citizenship 
recorded by Tunisian consular services44 (first-
generation migrants and born-abroad second and 
third generations together), about 186,000 were 
naturalized in their European host countries between 
2000 and 2014. Of these, 72 percent (133,419) were 
naturalised in France, 11 percent (20,707) in Italy and 
8.3 percent in Germany. 45
INWARD MIGRATION
Stock
The number of non-nationals living in Tunisia in April 
2014 stood at 53,490, 0.5 percent of the 10,982,754 
total resident population counted during the country’s 
sixth and most recent census. In 2004, 35,192 foreign 
nationals had been recorded during the previous 
census.
Europeans numbered 15,007 in 2014 and kept their 
large share within the foreign resident population 
in Tunisia. Of these, French nationals made up 15 
percent of all foreign residents, after nearly doubling 
their numbers since 2004. Nationals from African 
countries also increased in numbers, from 3,000 in 
2004 to 7,500 in 2014. Some are students,73 and a few 
are registered as refugees (Table 3). The transfer of the 
African Development Bank (ADB) from Abidjan in 
Ivory Coast to Tunis from 2003 to 2014 also brought 
many employees to Tunisia from African Member 
States. However, the figures of Sub-Saharan Africans 
in Tunisia are probably underestimated. It was said, for 
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Since Libya ceased to be the major outlet for Tunisian 
migrants in the Arab region,46 the Gulf States now 
host the bulk of the 43,000 Tunisian expatriates there. 
An estimated 30-35,000 Tunisians resided in the Gulf 
as of 2012-2014, mostly in Qatar, Saudi Arabia and 
the UAE. These countries attract Tunisians through 
bilateral technical cooperation schemes.47 Of the 3,379 
Tunisians recruited in 2014 by the Tunisia Agency 
for Technical Cooperation (ATCT), for instance, 78 
percent were in the Gulf region; more than a quarter (27 
percent) in Saudi Arabia alone where most (45 percent) 
were recruited in education and higher education. 
Qatar mostly recruited health specialists and military 
personnel that year, while positions offered in the UAE 
were mainly in sales and commerce.48 
Around 26,000 Tunisian migrants were settled in 
North America. As for the 28,000 first-generation 
Tunisian migrants recorded in Israel, they are members 
of the Tunisian Jewish community (estimated around 
105,000 persons in 1951). These made aliyah in the 
post-independence period, 1956-1968.49 
Most migrants from Tunisia are males (57 percent of 
all migrants in OECD countries); 77 percent are in 
working age groups (15 to 65 years and 32 percent in 
the 25 to 44 age category). However, these aggregated 
figures cover Tunisian migrants’ diverse demographic 
and socio-economic profiles by country of destination 
(Figure 1). France stands out as an exception, as it 
hosts older age groups: almost half (48 percent) of the 
Tunisian-born there are 55 and above, and 25 percent 
in the age group 65 and above. France has also the 
most balanced sex ratio: 54 percent of men on average.
instance, that some of the Bank’s employees (domestic 
workers) decided to stay on to continue working in 
Tunisia, irregularly.74 Moreover, Tunisia grants three-
month visas on arrival to some African nationalities.75 
This increased the numbers of those stranded in 
Tunisia on their way to the EU, who became irregular 
sojourners after the expiration of these visas. As 
Tunisia is no longer a significant departure point 
for Europe, some of these migrants have sought to 
reach Libya to embark for Europe. Those rescued at 
sea, as well as those expelled by Italy or intercepted 
by coast guards are readmitted by Tunisia and swell 
the country’s pool of irregular African migrants in a 
very precarious situation in the country.76 Estimates of 
(long-term) transit Sub-Saharan migrants in Tunisia 
rarely exceed 10,000.77
Arab countries’ nationals, and especially Algerians 
and Moroccans who together made up 30 percent 
of all non-nationals in the 2014 census, are the most 
numerous within the officially-recorded foreign 
population. However, Iraqis and Syrians increased 
their numbers, as well as Libyans who grew some five 
times between the two dates and made up 16 percent 
of all foreign residents in 2014. 
As emphasized in table 3, Syrians make up three-
quarters of the modest numbers of refugees registered 
by UNHCR mid-2016 in the country. 
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Child migrants (aged below 15) are rare everywhere. 
This indicates that Tunisian family migration is 
uncommon, except, to a certain extent, in Canada 
where 6 percent of all migrants are children. There, 
however, as well as in the UK, the 25-44 years age 
group predominates and sex ratios are particularly 
skewed: 65 and 70 males for 100 females, respectively 
in Canada and in the UK. This suggests that Tunisian 
expatriates may be families, as well as students and 
young male professionals who moved alone. In the 
UK, indeed, 20 percent of recent migrants (first 
permit holders) were residing for education-related 
purposes in 2015, while 80 percent of all migrants 
(recent, first permit holders and older settlers) were 
residing for employment purposes.50 Elsewhere in 
Europe (in Germany, Belgium, Sweden and Italy), 
migrants’ age distribution was also skewed towards 
active age groups and males outnumbered females: 61 
percent males in Italy, 66 percent in Sweden. However, 
family reunion was the prime pathway to residency 
in these countries: 66 to 78 percent of all first permit 
holders; 58 to 79 percent of all permit holders. This 
indicates that migrants have come as young adults to 
these countries, most of them for marriage with an 
EU citizen;51 prior to family formation and the birth 
of children in Europe.52 Besides the many migrants in 
family reunion schemes, Germany also hosted some 
Tunisians for humanitarian reasons, while 40 percent 
of those in Italy (all permit holders) were labourers. 
Figures of Syrian refugees in Tunisia as of mid-2015 
(last available data) quoted by Tunisian officials and 
social workers are usually much higher than the ones 
quoted by UNHCR (registered refugees) and in the 
census results. Estimates of Syrians in Tunisia range 
from between 4,00078 and as many as 9 to 12,000.79 This 
cannot be convincingly assessed; yet, IOM estimated 
that some 10,000 Syrians had entered Tunisia from the 
Algerian border up to December 2014,80 on their way 
to Libya.81 
Libyans might also be grossly underestimated in official 
figures. Their numbers are difficult to come by since 
they do not register as refugees, as indicated in Table 
3. Some are urbanites who moved to the Tunis region 
and other coastal towns; the less well-off or those with 
tribal connections in Tunisia stayed in the south in the 
border area. Libyan children are barred from enrolling 
in Tunisian public schools, but they can attend private 
educational institutes, as well as some schools opened 
by the Libyan government in Tunis. Tunisian hospitals, 
in the town of Sfax, especially, also accommodated vast 
numbers of Libyans wounded in the conflict.82 As of 
September 2014, the Tunisian Minister of Commerce 
stated that the country was hosting over one million 
Libyan refugees,83 while the Ministries of Interior 
and Foreign Affairs estimated that these numbered 
between 800,000 and 1.5 million.84 If accurate, these 
figures would mean that about 10 percent of Tunisia’s 
total population is composed of Libyans. 
Borders between the two countries have been 
temporarily closed, but mostly remained open to 
Libyans, who are able to enter Tunisia for a ninety-day 
period without requiring a visa in advance.85 However, 
it is unlikely that the stock of the Libyan migrants 
in Tunisia has remained stable since 2011. No data 
are available as to how many refugees have been 
commuting between the two countries, and how many 
of the most affluent refugees only transited to Tunisia 
before seeking asylum or residency elsewhere.86
Informality, therefore, blurs our knowledge of 
immigrants in Tunisia, and employment figures are 
equally elusive. Immigrants in an irregular situation, 
from Sub-Saharan African countries and from other 
countries in the Maghreb, survive in clandestine, 
low-skilled and low-pay economic activities.87 As for 
those in regular employment, foreign management-
level and technical cooperation personnel who are 
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In Tunisia, as elsewhere, migration is a selective process: 
migrants are twice as educated as non-migrants (Figure 
2). The UK’s and Canada’s points-based immigration 
system mostly channel highly-educated, post-graduate 
students and young highly-skilled professionals to 
these countries. In the rest of Europe, the immigration 
policies and socio-economic setup channeled less 
educated Tunisians. Tunisian migrants in Italy are 
even less educated than non-migrants in Tunisia; 
the development of labour-intensive activities (in 
construction, agriculture and services), in the 1990s, 
attracted these low-skilled labourers to Italy. 
As it happens, 76 percent of employed Tunisian 
migrants in Italy were in the three lowest categories 
of occupations;53 with almost half (46 percent) in 
“elementary occupations” alone. Only 7 percent 
were in managerial or highly-skilled positions in this 
country (15 percent in Sweden). By contrast, most 
Tunisians in Canada were to be found in highly-skilled 
professions: the three top categories of professions 
(the “managers”, “professionals” and “technicians and 
associate professionals”) employ 60 percent (38 percent 
in Britain). In France, Tunisian migrants can be found 
in all categories of professions: 39 percent are in the top 
three as well as in the three lowest-skilled categories. 
Those in Belgium displayed a relatively similar, diverse 
profile.54 Tunisians also often worked in “services and 
trade”-related professions. The numbers ranged from 
between 12 (France) and 32 percent (Sweden) of 
employed Tunisian migrants.
Flows
The propensity to migrate is high in Tunisia: 44 
percent of the country’s youth aged 15 to 29 expressed 
their desire to emigrate in 2010.55 During the 2000s, 
for example, net outward migration showed a growing 
negative net balance over the period. Annual net 
migration flows from Tunisia were estimated at 
-20,676 for the period 2009-2014.56 Yet, stocks of 
Tunisian migrants in Europe only expanded from 
414,898, to 539,049 during the 2000s. This is due to 
their slow rates of growth in France where they are 
most numerous: 1.2 percent a year on average during 
the decade. Everywhere else, however, the numbers of 
Tunisian migrants have risen: this is especially true of 
Italy where the numbers rose from 56,636 in 2001 to 
101,717 in 2011, a growth rate of 6 percent a year. In 
North America, the numbers of Tunisians more than 
not subject to a labour permit in Tunisia, made up 54 
percent of labour contracts in 2013.88 This means that 
Tunisia is not a major foreign employment market 
and mostly provides opportunities to non-nationals 
in the framework of Foreign Direct Investments 
schemes89 (secondments for instance). In 2014, labour 
permits granted to foreign labourers by the Ministry 
of Training and Employment (MFPE) went mainly to 
Europeans (58 percent of all permits), among whom 
the French (21 percent) and Italians (16.4 percent). The 
Moroccans came next with 12 percent of the permits 
issued that year.90 Most legal foreign labourers were 
employed in the manufacturing sector (28 percent), 
followed by the real estate sector (19 percent) in 2013 
(last available data).91 This high figure may be a result 
of the inflows of Libyan refugees since 2011.
Flows
Tunisia experienced an upsurge in immigration since 
the start of the Libyan crisis in February 2011. The first 
three months of the crisis witnessed massive cross-
border movements, reaching a peak at 7,000 daily 
arrivals 7 March 2011. Estimates of those having reached 
Tunisia over the course of 2011-2012 stood at around 1 
million persons. These broke down into 97,000 Tunisian 
returnees, 660,000 Libyans and 220,000 persons of thirty 
different nationalities, mostly Eritreans, Somalis and 
Sudanese, who had been residing in Libya.92 Migrants 
fleeing or returning from Libya were first taken care of 
by the Tunisian army, the local population and NGOs 
providing them with basic needs.93 
In order to deal with the growing numbers of refugees, 
several camps were installed between February and 
May 2011, to accommodate up to 20,000 third-country 
nationals. As flows were decreasing rapidly by mid-
2011, the Choucha camp run by UNHCR remained 
the only and biggest camp with over 3,700 refugees and 
asylum seekers. As of 31 January 2012, the vast majority 
of third-country nationals who came from Libya had 
either returned to their country of origin or had been 
resettled in third countries as refugees.94 As of October 
2012, 1,990 refugees and asylum seekers, as well as 
281 people outside UNHCR mandate remained in the 
camp.95 Yet, since the closure of the camp by UNHCR 
in June 2013, around 1,000 migrants, especially sub-
Saharan Africans, have been left without support and 
survive by begging.96 
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doubled during the period, from 6,540 to 14,032 in 
the US and from 5,230 to 11,765 in Canada. Yet, the 
fastest growing destination over the decade was Libya, 
where the Tunisian authorities reported about 95,000 
Tunisian expatriates on the eve of the 2011 revolution. 
The figure may be an underestimate, as informality 
was most common among Tunisians in Libya. 57
However, the inflows did not rise steadily everywhere.58 
Figures for the period 2000-2014 (Figure 3) emphasize 
a slowdown in entries to Germany at the end of the 
2000s, for instance, prior to a hike in inflows after 
2010. Movements of Tunisians into Italy are harder 
to decipher, as the effect of 2008 financial crisis is 
not visible in the figures. Rather, the hikes in entries 
observed in 2003-2004 and in 2008-2010 illustrate 
the results of the two campaigns of regularisation 
conducted in 2002-2004 and 2009 in that country. Yet, 
the sharp fall of numbers after 2012 suggests that Italy 
is now a less favoured destination for new Tunisian 
migrants, unlike France where entries went up slowly 
but steadily through the period. 
As regards Libya,59 in 2007 the Ras Jedir border 
crossing point was registering 17,000 movements 
(entries and exits) between the two countries daily.60 
During that year, 1.8 million Tunisians crossed the 
border to Libya.61 The brutal fall in the numbers of 
exits after that date probably reflects the imposition of 
visas to all residents, including Arabs, decided in 2007 
by the Libyan government. This was followed by 
announcements of deportation of irregulars.62 This 
may have deterred some Tunisians who intended to 
Waves of refugees from Libya experienced ebbs and 
flows. As indicated above in the “stocks” section, the 
size and patterns of the flows of Libyan refugees who 
progressively came to settle in Tunisia after February 
2011 are not known. Yet, various upsurges in fighting 
or battles sporadically forced new refugees to cross the 
border; increasing numbers of families with children 
were also said to have arrived in Tunisia, while the 
father kept commuting between the two countries. 
IOM Tunisia reports that over July and August of 
2014, up to 6,000 people per day were moving over 
the border from Libya to Tunisia. Among these were 
Sub-Saharan Africans, escaping the conflict in Libya 
or transiting through Tunisia on their way home. 
Yet, the Tunisian government proved hesitant in 
welcoming these flows and the border was, at times, 
closed. Non-Libyan migrants needed to present valid 
travel documents and proof of an onward journey and 
were only permitted to stay in Tunisia for 72 hours.97 
In 2016, border crossings with Libya were closed after 
clashes took place in the border town of Ben Gardane. 
Tunisia also built a 200-kilometre barrier stretching 
about half the length of its border with Libya in an 
attempt to prevent Da’esh militants from infiltrating.98 
These events had a great effect on Tunisia’s economy. 
The return of Tunisian expatriates from Libya was said 
to cost Tunisia about 0.6 percent of its GDP previously 
drawn from the workers’ remittances.99 Libyan tourism 
also fell, though some Libyan refugees continue using 
tourist facilities in Tunisia. Tunisians also affirm that 
the inflows of affluent Libyans led to price hikes, 
especially in real estate and housing sectors in urban 
areas. Besides, the closing of borders between the two 
countries affected cross-border trade and smuggling 
which used to support poor, rural communities in the 
governorates of Medenine and Tataouine, in the south 
of the country.100 
The post-uprising context also affected the nature of 
flows of (legal) foreign workers to the country. The 
number of work permits delivered to foreign labourers 
had peaked in 2007-2009 at around 7,800 permits. 
After a low in 2010-2011, perhaps the effect of the 
financial crisis and that of the uprisings, it picked up 
again to reach 6,617 in 2014.101 The distribution of 
the legal workforce by nationality has not changed 
drastically since the early 2000s. Europeans have kept 
their prominent place on the work market since 2002: 
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migrate legally. However, informality prevailed among 
Tunisian migrants in Libya who often originated from 
rural and tribal communities close to Libya’s borders. 
Tunisians may thus have continued migrating to Libya 
in smaller numbers.
Irregularity is indeed a major feature of Tunisian 
migration to neighbouring countries, and to Europe. 
Increasing social instability spurred emigration waves: 
records of Tunisians attempting to enter the EU illegally 
shot up in 2008 after the repression of social uprisings 
that took place in the Gafsa region, for instance.63 The 
Italian Ministry of Interior recorded 7,633 arrests of 
Tunisians arriving irregularly by sea in 2008, up from 
1,417 arrests in 2007. Similarly, as a consequence 
of the 2011 revolts, 28,047 migrants (among whom 
there were many Tunisians) arriving from Tunisia by 
sea were arrested by Italian coast guards: in 2010 the 
numbers had been just 650.
More generally, in 2011-12, the annual number of 
migrants almost doubled with respect to 2005-2010 
outflows, from 26,085 (average value for 2005-2010) 
to 50,391 (2011-12).64 However, since 2008, the net 
migration rates of Tunisians Residing Abroad (TRE) 
had become positive (i.e., more TRE entering Tunisia 
than exiting), as compared to net migration rates of 
-59,000 and -52,000 respectively in 2005 and 2006.65 
This probably indicates that two opposite dynamics 
have been at play since the 2000s. First, the deteriorating 
socio-economic situation in Tunisia during the 2000s, 
which acted as a spur for emigration, especially from 
rural areas. Second, the 2008 financial crisis in Europe, 
the changes in visa policies in Libya, as well as the 
blunt policies targeting the nationals from Arab Spring 
countries in the Gulf States since 2011,66 limited legal 
emigration from Tunisia. It may also have compelled 
some migrants to return. Therefore, irregular 
emigration was seen as the only option, all the more so 
as many who had embarked on unsuccessful irregular 
migration journeys originated from the central, and 
poorest regions of Tunisia.67 These young Tunisians 
had limited access to international labour markets, 
which required assets and capabilities they did not 
possess.68 Political instability in Tunisia, as well as the 
economic slowdown, following the 2008 financial crisis 
(that greatly affected Italy), and the change of regime 
in Tunisia, thus increased the irregular migration 
pressure from Tunisia. As for legal emigration, the 
resumption of TRE’s negative net migration rates 
21 percent of permits were  granted to French nationals 
over the period; 15-16 percent to Italians. Among Arab 
labourers, the share of the Algerians fell from 6 percent 
in 2002-2006 to 1 percent in 2014. Libyans and other 
Arab nationalities increased their participation, from 
1 percent in the first half of the 2000s to 5 percent in 
2014 and from 5 to 11 percent of all permits. These 
Arab nationals may be Syrians, who are the only Arab 
nationals who have gained in numbers since the crisis 
began. Yet, the numbers of these workers remain very 
low in regard to the estimated size of their national 
group in Tunisia: Libyan legal labourers, for instance, 
number only 331 in 2014. This confirms that most 
Libyans in Tunisia, either commute between the two 
countries, or live, in the case of the wealthier, off their 
savings. 
Foreign employment was more affected by the 
economic slowdown, which hit the country after the 
uprisings and the change in regime. The loss of job 
opportunities was particularly pronounced in the 
‘hotels and restaurants’; ‘transport’; ‘manufacturing’ 
and construction sectors, all dependent on foreign 
investments. However, the resumption of the hiring of 
foreign labourers after 2013 suggests that the Tunisian 
economy may be slowly recovering. The role potentially 
played by Libyan investments in this recovery, cannot, 
however, be measured due to an absence of data.
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since 2014 suggests that legal, perhaps more educated 
Tunisians, had found new outlets, among which North 
America, Germany and France as suggested in Figure 
3. Interestingly, figures of naturalization of Tunisians in 
the West have gone up in recent years. 7,018 Tunisians 
acquired French nationality in 2015, up from a low of 
5,546 naturalisations in 2012. In Italy, 4,411 Tunisians 
were naturalized in 2014; naturalization rates have 
grown from 0.4 percent in 2006 to 4.5 percent that 
year. In Canada, citizenship acquisitions went up from 
410 in 2013 to 1,520 in 2014. This perhaps indicates 
that Tunisian migrants are increasingly settling in their 
host country, or resort to “strategic transnationalism”69; 
securing a Western nationality to guarantee mobility 
in the context of the increasing “securitization” of 
migration. 
The movement of residency permits issued to Tunisian 
migrants in the 28 EU member states confirms the 
hypothesis of an increasing settlement of ‘older’ 
migrants, while new ones encounter difficulties in 
entering Europe. Figure 4, indeed, indicates that 
permits renewals have increased since 2008, while 
the number of new permits issued to Tunisians fell 
from about 35,000 in 2011 to 23,000 in 2012 and has 
remained low ever since. 
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Figure 5 indicates that, prior to their fall in 2012, the 
upsurge in first permit issuances observed in 2011 
concerned permits issued for “other reasons”. These are the 
six-month temporary protection status permits granted 
by Italy under the heading “Extraordinary reception 
measures for exceptional events”, to Tunisian migrants 
who arrived in Italy between 1 January and 5 April 2011 
(see introduction).70 Before this, Italy used to issue 45 to 47 
percent of all first permits granted to Tunisians in the EU: 
12,668 in 2008 and a high of 19,036 in 2011. As of 2015, 
Italy only issued 16 percent of these or 3,690. This is mainly 
due to the drastic limitations put on the entry of labourers 
and professionals (permits granted under the category of 
“remunerated activities”) in the EU since 2010.71 This is 
partly a consequence of the 2008 financial crisis. Italy was 
granting more than 80 percent of permits in this category 
until 2010 (around 8,000 permits). However, the lower-
skilled professions employing most Tunisian migrants in 
Italy (fishing, agriculture and construction for instance) 
suffered from the crisis and from the ensuing economic 
reforms. As of 2015, Italy only supplied 509 permits to 
Tunisian labourers. The numbers of permits delivered 
by France remained stable over the period and rose 
from 10,000 to 14,000 residencies; Germany channelled 
increasing numbers (from 856 to 2,246 permits granted). 
Figure 5 also illustrates the stragnation of family reunions 
in the EU since 2010, and the modest increase in the 
number of new Tunisian students in Europe. France, now 
the major receiver of new Tunisian migrants, issued 71 
percent of all student permits in the EU in 2015, up from 
60 percent in 2008. This is a sign of the growing French 
and EU preference for skilled and highly-skilled migrants 
from Tunisia,72 which leaves no more legal outlets for the 
less skilled ones. 
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